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Outline
• Introduction: Finland, CAP, subsidies, heterogeneity 
• Data and methods: survey, stated preferences, latent class
• Results: latent farmer classes behind insurance demand
• Conclusions: policy challenge for CAP
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Finland, CAP
• In the EU member states the crop damages are mainly compensated 
by ad hoc basis. 
• The compensation payment for crop damage amounts to an average 
of about €920 million per year.
• Individual member state specific programs. In Finland CDC scheme.
• In Finland we have a lacking culture on yield insurances, conformed 
with serious knowledge caps in development and administration of 
such insurances.
• The markets for crop insurance are developing in the EU. Premium 
subsidies could be as large as 65 %. 
• For subsidies there are EU wide rules, following strictly WTO green 
box regulations.
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Heterogeneity
• Decoupled income support is preferred in the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy CAP. Policies support all farms in the same way 
despite farmers’ risk preferences → deductible and scale are typically 
fixed. 
• The purpose of this study was to investigate the demand for crop 
insurance in Finland. Willingness to pay is interesting, but…
• … we were more interested in seeing, whether the farmers are 
heterogeneous according the weights they give for insurance 
attributes (price, deductible, scale and insurance type).
• Moreover, the farmers were grouped according to the weights they 
assigned to crop insurance attributes. 
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Data
• No existing markets → no data → hypothetical markets
• The choice experiment survey was conducted. 
• The survey was sent to a total of 5,000 farmers in Finland. 
• Respondents were shown six crop insurance product cards. 
Each choice card presented two different crop insurance 
products with varying attributes. 
• The farmers were asked to select the most suitable crop 
insurance product for them (including “no buy”). 
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Choice card
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… methods
• Stated preferences, choice experiment
• Latent class model, maximum likelihood + iterations based on number of classes   
• The farmer classes were determined purely based on the choices 
made by the individuals in the choice experiment. The individual farm / 
farmer characteristics were set to be inactive, and they did not consequently affect the 
latent class model (number of classes)
• Choice models measured utility, thus coefficients are not 
interpretable in economic terms, despite their signs. 
• Class specific implicit prices for attributes are calculated as,  
where βk is the parameter of kth attribute, and βp is the parameter of 
price coefficient.
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Results
• A model with three farmer classes was selected based on BIC statistics and reasonable 
class sizes. 
• Insurance type turned out to be insignificant in farmers’ choices.
• The Wald p-values indicate that rest of the attributes were jointly significant.
• Wald* p-values show that only the price attributes were class dependent. However, this is very important 
for economic interpretation of the results. 
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Model for Choices 
     
 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Overall 
 R² 0.3393 0.2091 0.2903 0.5395 
 R²(0) 0.4213 0.9389 0.4058 0.5774 
 size  0.42 0.3 0.28 
  Attributes Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Wald p-value Wald* p-value 
Reference level 0 0 0 0 0 
1 -1.2442 -7.464 0.0023 0.0024 0.0062 
2 -1.1769 -12.0135 0.0487 
  3 2.4211 19.4775 -0.051 
  Price -0.1219 -0.5788 -0.0752 <0.001 0.029 
Deductible -2.9507 -29.1756 -2.7591 <0.001 0.39 
Scale 0.0054 0.0081 0.0044 <0.001 0.3 
The reference level for all attributes is set to 0. Constant 3 refers to the “no buy” option. 
All estimated parameters are significant at the 99% level based on z-statistics. 
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Interpretaation
• Implicit prices (IP) are the marginal rates of substitution between price and product 
attributes. 
• Implicit prices provide some guidelines for the labeling of latent farmer groups revealed 
by the estimation.
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IP (€/ha) Class1 Class2 Class3
Deductible (+10%) -2.4 -5.0 -3.7
Scale (+ €100/ha) 4.4 1.4 5.9
WTP*) 6.03 -10.92 6.55
*) Deductible 30 % and scale €300/ha




• They have the 
lowest IP for the 
scale.
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Yield risk managers, 42%
• Lower (negative) IP for 
deductible
• Farmers look for insurance 
products that are more of the 
catastrophe prevention type.
Insurers , 28%
• High and negative IP for 
the deductible
• Prefer shallow loss type 
insurances
IP (€/ha) Class1 Class2 Class3
Deductible (+10%) -2.4 -5.0 -3.7
Scale (+ €100/ha) 4.4 1.4 5.9
WTP*) 6.03 -10.92 6.55
*) Deductible 30% and scale €300/ha


































45 26 29 
 
Farm size (ha) 10–19.99 29 41 29 
 
  20–29.99  37 43 20 
 
 30–49.99  54 20 26 
 
 50–99.99  41 20 39 
 
 ≥100 54 15 31 
 
Region West 51 22 27 
 
 East 31 29 40 
 
 North 14 29 57 
 
 South 41 30 30 
 
West: Pohjanmaa, Satakunta 
East: Kaakkois-Suomi, Kainuu, Savo, Karjala  
North: Kainuu, Lappi 
South: Uusimaa, Varsinaissuomi  
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Conclusions
• Used dataset reveals heterogeneity among farmers regarding 
insurance attributes → one size does not fit all.
• No clear linear connection between latent groups and farm 
characteristics was found.
• Uniform catastrophic assistance rules  for  whole Finland 
would be challenging to implement because of the regional 
heterogeneity in farmers preferences.    
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